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Abstract—Data randomization or scrambling has been effec-
tively used in various applications to improve the data security. In
this paper, we use the idea of data randomization to proactively
randomize the spectrum (re)allocation to improve connections’
security. As it is well-known that random (re)allocation fragments
the spectrum and thus increases blocking in elastic optical
networks, we analyze the tradeoff between system performance
and security. To this end, in addition to spectrum randomization,
we utilize an on-demand defragmentation scheme every time a
request is blocked due to the spectrum fragmentation. We model
the occupancy pattern of an elastic optical link (EOL) using a
multi-class continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) under the
random-fit spectrum allocation method. Numerical results show
that although both the blocking and security can be improved
for a particular so-called randomization process (RP) arrival
rate, while with the increase in RP arrival rate the connections’
security improves at the cost of the increase in overall blocking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing high data rate applications in optical networks
against physical layer attacks or unauthorized observation has
long been subject of intense studies [1], [2]. In elastic optical
networks (EONs), the security challenge can be mitigated in
various ways, among others by data scrambling along the
code, time and frequency domains [3]. The data scrambling
along the multiple dimensions helps to resist the brute-force
attacks, and makes it difficult for the attacker to decode
the data. With the flexibility in assigning subcarriers, we
believe that spectrum allocation in EONs also present a unique
opportunity to provide optical layer security. If the spectrum
randomization process is regularly performed, then only a
portion of a particular user’s data will be observed over a
range of frequencies that is listened by an eavesdropper.
However, the random spectrum (re)reallocation fragments
the spectrum, and as many previous studies have shown,
increases the blocking in EONs [4], [5]. [4] showed that the
blocking probability due to bandwidth fragmentation in EONs
depends on the size of the available spectrum blocks on a
link, and their alignment over different links on the routing
paths. In [5], we analytically showed that spectrum reallocation
increases the overall blocking in an elastic optical link (EOL).
To alleviate this problem, spectrum defragmentation scheme
can be utilized to consolidate the free spectrum. During de-
fragmentation, also some connections could be disrupted due
to the retuning of transceivers and reconfiguration of optical
switches. Although the disruption can be minimized using
some techniques like “make-before-break” [6] or “hitless”
defragmentation methods [7], [8], spectrum reallocation is not
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Fig. 1. All possible state transitions from and into a RaaS state due to RP.
desirable. Therefore, finding a tradeoff between random spec-
trum “scrambling” and the need to defragment the spectrum
to improve the performance is no easy task, which has not
been addressed to date. As we show, modeling a single EOL
spectrum (re)allocation is analytically a challenge under the
spectrum contiguity constraint, and it gets more complicated
in networks due to an additional spectrum continuity constraint
(assuming no spectrum converter in EONs) [9]–[13].
In this paper, we scramble/randomize the spectrum usage
pattern to secure elastic optical links, which we refer to as
randomization-as-a-service (RaaS) scheme. The RaaS can be
performed proactively at random or periodic intervals, with
mean RP interarrival time ( 1λS ). However, we also show that
blocking gets worse due to this randomization process (∝
λS). To this end, we utilize a defragmentation-as-a-service
(DaaS) scheme, which is triggered every time a connection
would be blocked because the spectrum is scrambled and
fragmented. For the analytical modeling of the combined DaaS
and RaaS, we model an EOL using the multi-class continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC) and include RaaS and DaaS states
in addition to regular data service states. Combining proactive
RaaS and on-demand DaaS, we show that security is as good
as in the RaaS system, while blocking is better than if only
a RaaS system used, with much lower reconfiguration time
(than call holding times) and for a range of moderate loads.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the model description. In Section III, we present the
overall blocking and the security analysis. Section IV evaluates
the performance. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The randomization of spectrum allocation makes it more
difficult for an attacker to detect the spectrum assignment
pattern and to successfully demodulate the spectrum, thus
increasing the system security. At the same time, the ran-
domization of spectrum allocation might result in fragmented
spectrum. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the assignment
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
05
04
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 18
 A
pr
 20
16
DaaS 
(Sd2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
S10 
S8 
S7 
1λ
S9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
( )
d
Sdp µ27 ( ) d
Sdp µ210
1λ
Fig. 2. State transitions from and into a DaaS state for a demand of 3-slots.
of spectrum slots to existing connections is randomly recon-
figured by entering the RaaS process (state SR4), and as a
result, one of the states S7, S8, S9 and S10 is chosen with
equal probability. Notably, the randomization feature can also
be used to reallocate spectrum resources to consolidate free
slots, which we call as a DaaS. This is illustrated in Fig.
2, where a request (say Ri) with demand d = 3 slots will
be blocked in fragmented states S8 and S9 in a regular or
RaaS system. In the combined RaaS-DaaS model, however,
the arrival of the request Ri into such fragmented states
will trigger DaaS process (state Sd2), which reconfigures the
existing connection(s) and finally, the system will move to
defragmented states S7 or S10 with equal probability.
A. Underlining Assumptions
We model the occupancy pattern of an EOL using a multi-
class CTMC [10]–[13] with the following assumptions.
i) The RaaS process is triggered for spectrum randomization
at exponential RP inter-arrival times TS with average rate λS .
ii) The DaaS process is triggered when a request is blocked
due to the fragmentation of spectrum.
iii) Call inter-arrival times TEk and call holding times THk of
class-k requests are independent and exponentially distributed
with average rates λk and µk, respectively.
iv) In RaaS and DaaS states, reconfiguration times TRT are
exponentially distributed with rate µd.
v) The services of all existing requests are interrupted during
the reconfiguration times of the DaaS and RaaS processes.
vi) Further incoming requests are blocked during the DaaS
and RaaS periods, referred to as reconfiguration blocking.
vii) We differentiate between resource blocking and blocking
due to fragmentation; in the case of resource blocking, the total
number of free slots does not satisfy the demand, while in the
case of fragmentation blocking, there are enough free slots,
but there is no sufficient amount of consecutive free blocks to
satisfy the demand.
Assumption (v) is disadvantageous, because traffic interrup-
tion of some or all existing connections does happen during
reconfiguration in the real system, though there are efficient
techniques to address this issue [6]–[8]. Due to assumption
(vi) we would experience an increase in overall call blocking
probability. However, the results show that although reconfig-
uration blocking is added to the resource and fragmentation
blocking (assumption vii), the overall blocking can be lower
than a regular system without spectrum reallocation strategy, if
the spectrum reallocation time is much lower than the normal
service times of the connections.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND THE PARAMETERS USED IN THE MODEL
Notation Description
C Total number of spectrum slots (or capacity units)
λk (µk) Arrival (service) rate of class k calls, where k = 1, 2, · · · , K
1/λS Mean RP interarrival time (E[TS ] = 1/λS )
1/µd Mean reconfiguration time (E[TRT ] = 1/µd)
n ≡ (n1, n2, . . . , nK), where nk is the number of class k calls
Si Occupancy state for normal operation i = 1, ..., NSA
Sdν Defragmentation state ν = 1, ..., ND
SRν Randomization state ν = 1, ..., NR
pSdνi ( p
SRν
i ) transition probability from state Sdν (SRν ) to target state Si
nk(Si) Number of class-k calls in state Si
n(Si) ≡ (n1(Si), . . . , nK(Si)), realization of n in state Si
a(Si, k) Number of different ways class-k call can be allocated in Si
FSl(Si) Size of lth fragment of free slots in state Si
NSA, ND, NR Number of regular, DaaS, and RaaS states respectively
B. Mapping Transitions Between System States
For the combined RaaS-DaaS model, some of the notations
and parameters are listed and described in Table I. Here, in
addition to regular data service states (Si), we have RaaS and
DaaS states, which are used for spectrum randomization and
defragmentation operations, respectively. Each RaaS (DaaS)
state is associated with a non-overlapping set of states (Si)
with same connection pattern as SRν (Sdν), where a connec-
tion pattern is defined by the number of connections per class,
i.e. n(Sj) = (n1(Sj), ..., nK(Sj)). In general, we define a set
of states with same connection pattern as Sj as follows.
Γ(Sj) = {Si|n(Si) = n(Sj), i = 1, ..., NSA} (1)
It should be noted that a specific RaaS state SRν is triggered
(i.e., Si → SRν) by states, with same connection pattern
but different spectrum occupancy pattern, belonging to the
set Γ(SRν). Furthermore, after randomization in the RaaS
state SRν , the transition SRν → Si can also be given by
the set Γ(SRν). For example, in Fig. 1, all states out of set
Γ(SR4) = {S7, S8, S9, S10} transit to a RaaS state SR4 at
rate λS . And, after randomization process in SRν , it transits
back to a randomly chosen system state Si ∈ Γ(SR4) with
rate pSR4i µd = µd/4, i = {7, 8, 9, 10}. Due to the ran-
domization strategy, we assume equal transition probabilities
pSRνi =
1
|Γ(SRν)| , where |Γ(SRν | is the number of elements
in Γ(SRν).
The mapping between a DaaS state to regular states, on
the other hand, is not straightforward, since not all but only
fragmented regular states Si with n(Si) = n(Sdν) trigger
transitions into the DaaS state Sdν . Similarly, from Sdν
transitions occur to only defragmented states Sj satisfying
n(Sj) = n(Sdν), where in a defragmented state Sj , all empty
slots form a single block of free spectrum. Let us first define a
fragmented state, which can not allocate a large enough block
FSl(Si) of l consecutive free slots to a class-k request of
demand dk > l, even though it contains equal or more than
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Fig. 3. Partial state diagram with transitions leading to spectrum randomization and defragmentation in the RaaS-DaaS model under RF allocation policy.
dk number of free slots, as follows.
fr(Si, k) =

1 if dk > maxlFSl(Si) and
dk ≤ C −
∑
j djnj(Si)
0 otherwise
(2)
Using the above function, the set of fragmented states for
class-k requests is defined as
FB(k) = {Si|fr(Si, k) = 1, i = 1, · · · , NSA},∀k. (3)
Furthermore, the set of classes for which state Si is a fragmen-
tation state is FI(Si) = {k | Si ∈ FB(k)}, i = 1, · · · , NSA}.
Resource blocking states, on the other hand, do not have
sufficient free slots to satisfy an incoming class-k request, i.e.,
RB(k) = {Si|dk > C −
∑
j
djnj(Si), i = 1, ..., NSA}. (4)
Now using Eq. (1), Γ(Sdν) comprises all states with
connection pattern defined by DaaS state Sdν . The subset
FF(Sdν , k) = Γ(Sdν)
⋂
FB(k) defines the set of states to be
de-fragmented due to an arriving class-k request, e.g. in Fig.2,
for a class-1 arrival the set FF(Sd2, 1) includes the fragmented
states S8 and S9. Similarly, after reconfiguration, a DaaS state
Sdν will transit to a new target state Si ∈ FT(Sdν) with
probability pSdνi , e.g. in Fig.2 from state Sd2 to state S10
with rate µdpSd210 . A target state is defined by the property,
that all its free spectrum slots build one consecutive block
FS1(Si) irrespective of its spectral location. Thus, the set of
target states is given as follows.
FT(Sdν)={Si|FS1(Si)=C−
∑
j
djnj(Si),∀Si∈Γ(Sdν)} (5)
Hence, the transition probability is given by pSdνi =
1
|FT(Sdν)| .
In Fig. 2, we have FT(Sd2) = {S7, S10} with two possible
target states, hence |FT(Sd2)| = 2 and pSd27 = pSd210 = 1/2.
Now, we consider an example of an EOL with capacity
C = 7 slots under random-fit (RF) policy, see Fig. 3. There
are two different classes of requests with demands 3 and 4
consecutive slots. Here, we show only a part of all states
and transitions, where a new call of class k = 1 arrives in
state S1 with demand d1 = 3. Under RF policy, it allocates
one of the possible assignments shown by the transitions from
S1 to states {S2, S3, S4, S5, S6}. In the target states, we have
n1(Si) = 1, i = 2, ..., 6 class-1 calls, which will leave F1 = 4
free slots, thus there are a(S1, k = 1) =
(n1+F1)!
n1!F1!
= 5
different ways to allocate the 7 free slots, and transitions occur
with rate λ1/5. Similarly, a new call of class k = 2 arrives
in state S6 with demand d2 = 4 and can occupy only the
possible state S15. On the other hand, transition rates out of
states Si, i = 1, ..., 15, will occur due to the departure of a
class-1 and/or class-2 requests with rate µk, k = 1, 2. As we
can see, when a class-2 request (4 slots) arrives, blocking of
the request due to fragmentation should occur in the set of
states FB(2) = {S3, S4, S5}. In this simple example, we have
FF(Sd1, 2) = Γ(Sd1) ∩ FB(2) ≡ FB(2), and the arrivals of
such class-2 requests with rate λ2 will trigger the transition
from states Si ∈ FF(Sd1, 2) to DaaS state Sd1. Similarly, the
set of states FB(1) = {S4, S8, S9} are fragmented states for a
class-1 call handled by DaaS states Sd1 and Sd2. Notice that
we have FF(Sd1, 1) = Γ(Sd1) ∩ FB(1) = {S4}, and S4 is
also handled by Sd1 for a class-1 arrival with rate λ1. In total,
this results into the transition from S4 to Sd1 with joint rate
λ1 + λ2. The remaining states out of FB(1) are handled by
Sd2 due to the set FF(Sd2, 1) = Γ(Sd2)∩FB(1) = {S8, S9}
as shown in Fig.2. In a similar form, all states out of the set
Γ(SR1) = {S2, S3, S4, S5, S6} will also transit to a RaaS state
SR1, and because |Γ(SR1)| = 5 the process transits back to
a randomly chosen state Si ∈ Γ(SR1) with rate µd/5.
It should be noted that while the process is in DaaS
or RaaS states, existing connections effected by spectrum
reconfiguration are interrupted for a time duration equal to
the exponentially distributed reconfiguration time TRT with
mean 1/µd. Due to the memoryless property of the exponential
distribution, the remaining call holding times of interrupted
calls are again exponentially distributed with mean 1/µk.
Thus, all transitions due to call terminations after interruption
are also modeled with rates µk.
III. BLOCKING AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
At first, we show how to derive the global balance equations
(GBEs) of the Markov chain. Furthermore, we define the
following terms to calculate the transition rates of the system.
A(Si, k) =

1 if a class-k request is accepted, or
blocked due to fragmentation inSi
0 otherwise
(6)
A(Si, k) determines if a transition from state Si is possible due
to the arrival of a class-k call, and include the case that Si is
a fragmented state for this class, i.e k ∈ FI(Si). Additionally,
T±(Sj , Si, k) determines the cause of transition if it is due to
allocation (+) or deallocation (-), given as
T±(Sj , Si, k) =

1 if Sj → Si due to class-k
arrival (departure) in Sj
0 otherwise.
(7)
To model the different many-to-one and one-to-many map-
ping between RaaS and regular states Si, we introduce an
indicator function, which compares the connection pattern of
states.
δ(Si, SRν) =
{
1 if n(Si) = n(SRν)
0 otherwise.
(8)
The above relation can also be used to define the many-to-
one mapping from fragmented states Si to a DaaS state Sdν
(i.e., δ(Si, Sd1) = 1 with the restriction Si ∈
⋃
k FF(Sd1, k).
Similarly, one-to-many mapping from a DaaS state Sdν to
target defragmented states (in FT(Sdν)) is defined as follows.
σ(Sdν , Sj) =
{
1 if Sj ∈ FT(Sdν)
0 otherwise
(9)
Finally, the GBE of each regular occupancy state Si under
the RF spectrum allocation policy can be obtained by Eq. (10).(
K∑
k=1
A(Si, k)λk + nk(Si)µk + λS
)
pi(Si) =
NSA∑
j=1,j 6=i
K∑
k=1
(
λkT
+(Sj , Si, k)
a(Sj , k)
+ T−(Sj , Si, k)µk
)
pi(Sj)
+
ND∑
ν=1
σ (Sdν , Si)
µdpi(Sdν)
|FT(Sdν)|
+
NR∑
ν=1
δ (SRν , Si)
µdpi(SRν)
|Γ(SRν)| , i = 1, · · · , NSA (10)
In Eq. (10), left hand side represents the output flow rate
from the state Si including transitions to DaaS (taken into
account by A(Si, k)) and RaaS states (rate λS), while the
right hand side represents input flow rate into the sate Si. More
precisely, the second line of Eq. (10) represents the input flows
from other regular states Sj , while the third line of Eq.(10)
defines the rate from exactly one DaaS state to state Si. The
indicator function σ(Sdν , Si) = 1 selects a DaaS state only
if Si ∈ FT(Sdν) i.e., if Si is a target defragmented state,
and it can be reached after reconfiguration in Sdν with rate
µd
|FT(Sdν)| . In the last line, the indicator δ (SRν), Si) selects
a correct RaaS state SRν with connection pattern equivalent
to the state Si, where the factor |Γ(SRν)| takes into account,
that the RaaS state only randomly selects a target state Si with
the probability 1/|Γ(SRν)|.
Similarly, the GBEs of a RaaS state SRν and a DaaS state
Sdν can be given by Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), respectively.
µdpi(SRν) = λS
∑
Sj∈Γ(SRν)
pi(Sj), ν = 1, 2, · · · , NR (11)
µdpi(Sdν)=
K∑
k=1
λk
∑
Sj∈FB(k)
δ (Sj , Sdν)pi(Sj), ν = 1, ..., ND (12)
In Eq. (12), the function δ (Sj , Sdν) selects the corresponding
fragmented states Sj ∈ FB(k) with related rate λk.
As an example, the GBE for state S4 in Fig.3 (which is the
only one of the fragmentation states for both classes) is given
by (λ1+λ2+µ1+λS)pi(S4) = λ1/5pi(S1)+µd/5pi(SR1). The
input rate λ1/5 (µd/5) is due to transition S1 → S4 (SR1 →
S4), as explained in Sec. II-B. For the output rate, a departure
of an existing class-1 connection takes place with rate µ1,
and RP requests arrive with rate λS . Furthermore, we have
two different classes of requests that will be blocked due to
fragmentation, i.e. S4 ∈ FF(Sd1, 1) and S4 ∈ FF(Sd1, 2), and
thus will cause transition to a DaaS state Sd1 with total rate
λ1+λ2. Similarly, we can write the GBE for a RaaS state SR3,
which is reached from a set of states Γ(SR3) = {S14, S15}
when a RP request arrives with rate λS in one of these states.
After randomization in SR3, system will return back to one
of the possible states in Γ(SR3). However, the total output
flow rate from SR3 is still µd. Hence, the GBE of state SR3
is given by µdpi(SR3) = λS (pi(S14) + pi(S15)). The GBE
of a DaaS state Sd1 can also be written as µdpi(Sd1) =
λ2pi(S3)+(λ1+λ2)pi(S4)+λ2pi(S5). In this example, we have
δ(Sj , Sd1) = 1 for regular state Sj ∈ FB(1), which selects
a state S4 for class-1, as well as Sj ∈ FB(2) which selects
states S3, S4, S5 for class 2 arrivals.
Under the stationary condition, the state probabilities
pi = [pi(S1), pi(S2), · · · , pi(SNSA), pi(SR1), · · · , pi(SRNR),
pi(Sd1), · · · , pi(SdND )] can be calculated by solving pi Q = 0
subject to
∑
i pi(Si) +
∑
ν pi(SRν) +
∑
ν pi(Sdν) = 1, where
N = NSA + NR + ND is the total number of states, and Q
is the transition rate matrix.
The blocking per class-k due to the unavailability
of resources, i.e., resource blocking (RB), and due to
fragmentation, i.e. fragmentation blocking (FB) can be
calculated using Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), respectively.
RB(k)=
∑
Si∈RB(k)
pi(Si) (13) FB(k)=
∑
Si∈FB(k)
pi(Si) (14)
In a RaaS system (I), i.e., without DaaS states and associated
transitions, reconfiguration blocking can be given as follows.
RCBI =
NR∑
ν=1
pi(SRν) (15)
On the other hand, the reconfiguration blocking in the com-
bined RaaS-DaaS system (II) is given as follows.
RCBII =
NR∑
ν=1
pi(SRν) +
ND∑
ν=1
pi(Sdν) (16)
It should noted that RaaS and DaaS states are blocking states
for all classes of requests. Finally, the overall blocking in the
RaaS system (I) and the combined RaaS-DaaS system (II) can
be given by the Eq. (17) and Eq. (18), respectively.
BP I = RCBI +
∑
k λk(RB(k) + FB(k))∑
k λk
(17)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Observation Window [6, 9] Si 
Fig. 4. An example of eavesdropping in spectrum window [6, 9].
BP II = RCBII +
∑
k λk(RB(k) + FB(k))∑
k λk
(18)
In a regular system i.e., without DaaS and RaaS states,
the GBEs can be simplified. In Eq. (10), all transitions
from and into DaaS (Sdν) and RaaS (SRν) states are not
present, which can simply be modeled by setting µd = 0
and λS = 0. Furthermore, Eq. (12) and (11) have to be
omitted. In the regular system, in additional to the blocking
due non-availability of resources, blocking also occurs due
to the fragmentation. Hence, the overall blocking for regular
system can be calculated as, i.e.,
BP regular =
∑
k λk(RB(k) + FB(k))∑
k λk
(19)
A. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we show how spectrum randomization
can improve the connections’ security. Consider a scenario,
where an eavesdropper gets access to a transponder with fixed
capacity f0−fn to spoof the data of a particular user. It should
be noted that if RaaS is not performed within the lifetime of
the user’s connection allocated over f0 − fn, then all data
volume of the connection is observed. Therefore, in this case,
security of those data volumes depends if the eavesdropper can
decode the data or not. However, in our model, only a fraction
of the user’s data will be observed by the attacker if RaaS is
performed frequently, which enhances the data security on top
of the encryption. RaaS states are included for this purpose,
which randomly reassign subcarrier slots to connections. We
assume that RaaS is triggered at exponential RP inter-arrival
times TS with average rate λS . And, after randomization, it
returns to one of all possible states out of set Γ(SRν) having
same connection pattern (but different occupancy patterns) as
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3. Let us calculate the total number
of possible rearrangements of connections in a state Si. If the
state Si contains nk(Si) connections of class−k with demand
dk, and there are E(Si) = C −
∑K
k=1 nk(Si)dk empty slots.
Then, for the RF policy and without distinguishing the same
class of connections, the number of all possible rearrangements
of connections of Si with spectrum contiguity constraint can
be given as follows [11].
Rn(Si) =
(
E(Si) +
∑K
k=1 nk(Si)
)
!
E(Si)!
∏K
k=1 nk(Si)!
(20)
Now, let us assume that an eavesdropper can observe any
part of spectrum with slot-width W , where W ≤ C, and
the observed window is uniformly distributed over the entire
spectrum. For example in Fig. 4, the probability (pW ) that at
any point in time the observed window lies in the range [6,
9] is 1/11, since there are 11 (=14 - 4 +1) different ways of
observation across spectrum with C = 14 and W = 4. In gen-
eral, for a uniform distribution, pW = 1C−W+1 . Furthermore,
an attack (eavesdrop) is defined as successful if the observed
connections within the spectrum window (nin) before and after
a randomization process remains same, and the probability of
a successful attack for an observation window of size W (i.e.,
PWSA) is given as follows.
PWSA =
NSA∑
i=2
[
PWSA(Si)×
pi(Si)∑NSA
j=2 pi(Sj)
]
,
where PWSA(Si) =
C−W+1∑
j=1
pW × R
j
nW(Si)
Rn(Si)
(21)
In Eq. (21), PWSA(Si) is the successful attack probability
given that the system is in state Si, and it is given by the
expected value of the ratio of RjnW(Si) and Rn(Si). This
ratio gives the successful attack probability for a given window
[j, j + W − 1] and state Si. Here, RjnW(Si) defines the
possible number of rearrangements of connections of n(Si)
which results in same nin in the window [j, j + W − 1]
before and after the randomization. Consider example in Fig.
4, where an attacker listens to a connection (with demand 3-
slots) within its observation window [6, 9] when the system is
in state Si. Here, there is a single connection for every class
with demand dk = {2, 3, 4}, k = 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, for
a given connection pattern n(Si) = (1, 1, 1) and 5 empty
slots, the randomization process will result in one of all
possible rearrangements i.e., 280 (= (5+3)!5! ) . It should be
noted that there is only one connection with dk = 3-slots
inside the observation window. Therefore, for an attack to be
successful, the inside connection pattern nin(Si) = (0, 1, 0)
should be same as before and after the randomization. In
general, the number of such rearrangements (RjnW(Si)) is
not straightforward. However, for a small-scale EOL, we can
calculate the number of such rearrangements by counting all
states that comprise same connection pattern n, and same nin.
In Fig. 4, it is easy to see that the number of rearrangements
inside the window [6, 9] i.e., R6nin(Si) = 2 (Eq. (20));
and there are 16 possible rearrangements of connections
and free slots outside the window (i.e., R6nout(Si) = 16,
explained latter). Therefore, there are R6nW(Si) = 32 possible
spectrum occupancy patterns out of 280, where a 3-slots
connection within the window [6, 9] can be successfully
observed even after the randomization. Now, we show in three
steps how to find the number of rearrangements outside the
window, which is similar to a “partition” problem – a NP
hard problem [14]. Firstly, form a multiset E of elements
as 1 (for each free slot) and demand dk (for connections
in nout(Si)). Secondly, find the number of possible ways
of partitioning of E into two subsets E1 and E2 such that∑
ei∈E1 ei = CL and
∑
ei∈E2 ei = CR, where CL and CR
are the number of slots to the left and to the right of the
window, respectively. Finally, for each partition set find the
possible permutations of the elements. In Fig. 4, we have four
free slots and two connections with demands d1 = 2 and
d3 = 4 (i.e., nout(Si) = (1, 0, 1) for K = 3) outside the
window. Here, E = {1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4}, and CL = CR = 5.
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Fig. 5. Evaluation of RaaS model with C = 20: (a) blocking parts in a Regular and RaaS system; (b) overall blocking in a Regular and RaaS models for
various reconfiguration rate (µd) and RP arrival rates λS ; and (c) fraction of observed data in RaaS model for various λS at a fixed µd = 100.
There are two partitions {e1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), e2 = (1, 4)}
and {e1 = (1, 4), e2 = (1, 1, 1, 2)} which sum to 5 each.
Therefore, the total number of permutations of partition set
elements is 2× 43! × 2! = 16, thus R6nout(Si) = 16.
The average number of RP performed during a lifetime of a
connection (Nr) can be calculated as the ratio of the average
holding time of a connection and the average RP interarrival
time i.e., Nr =
1/µk
1/λS
= λSµk , where we restrict Nr ∈ N for
λS = nµk, n = {1, 2, · · · }. Until RP is triggered for the first
time, an attacker observes data successfully with probability 1.
Therefore, the amount of data successfully observable before
RP is b× 1λS ×1, where b is the average data rate observed in
a window of size W . Similarly, until the 2nd RP, successfully
observable data is b× 1λS ×[1+PWSA]. In general, the amount of
successfully observable data until N thr RP is given as follows.
DWSA = b×
1
λS
[
1 + PWSA + · · ·+ [PWSA]Nr−1
]
= b× 1
λS
× 1− [P
W
SA]
Nr
1− PWSA
(22)
Now, the total amount of data transmitted during the mean
holding time 1/µk is bµk . Therefore, the fraction of success-
fully observed data is given as the ratio of successful observed
data and total transmitted data, and given as follows.
Λ[1,W ] =
µk
λS
× 1− [P
W
SA]
λS
µk
1− PWSA
(23)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED FOR THE NUMERICAL RESULTS
EOL capacity C = 20 C = 100
Demands (dk) {4, 6, 8} {5, 10, 15}
Reconfiguration rate (µd) {10, 100} {100, 1000}
RP arrival rate (λS ) {1, 2,· · · , 10} {1, 2,· · · , 10}
In this section, we present the analytical and verifying
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation results for a small-scale EOL
with capacity C = 20 spectrum slots. Since the number of states
increases exponentially with the number of slots, we present
MC simulation results for a large-scale EOL with capacity C =
100 slots. The parameters used for the two different scenarios
are listed in Table II. Arrival rates are uniformly distributed
i.e., λk = λK , where λ is the total arrival rate. We assume mean
holding time as one unit for all classes of requests [10]–[12].
Load on the link is calculated as
∑K
k=1
λkdk
µk
. We consider
random-fit spectrum allocation for the performance evaluation
due to the nature of our model which randomizes the spectrum
irrespective of the spectrum allocation policy.
In Fig. 5, we evaluate our RaaS model (i.e., with RaaS
states, but without DaaS states) against a regular system
without spectrum reallocation. Fig. 5a shows the blocking
parts due to the lack of resources (RB, Eq. 13), fragmentation
(FB, Eq. 14) and reconfiguration (RCB, Eq. 15). As expected,
in a regular and RaaS systems and for traffic load range shown
here, the blocking is dominated by fragmentation and not
by resource unavailability. In Fig. 5b, blocking in our RaaS
model is always higher than the regular system irrespective
of the λS and µd. However, the overall blocking in RaaS
system comes closer to the blocking in regular system when
µd = 100. The reason is that when mean reconfiguration time
(E[TRT ] = 1/µd) reduces (i.e., rate is increased from 10 to
100), then the number of requests arriving during reconfig-
uration also reduces, and hence the RCB reduces. It should
be noted that when the average RP interarrival time decreases
(i.e., λS increases), then blocking also increases significantly.
The reason is that RaaS states are called frequently and
randomization does result in fragmented spectrum. However,
with the increase in the average RP arrival rate (λS), the
fraction of observed data decreases exponentially (in Fig. 5c),
which means security also increases exponentially. Here, the
fraction of observed data is plotted (Eq. (23)) at fixed link
load of 20 Erlangs. Additionally, we see that when the size of
the observation window W increases, the fraction of observed
data also increases due to the increase in the probability of
success (Eq. (21)). Note that when window size (W ) equals
to capacity (C), full spectrum can be observed with probability
1 (Eq. (21)), and the attacker will observe 100% of data.
It should be noted that RaaS model provides security at the
cost of a slight increase in blocking. Therefore, now we present
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Fig. 6. Evaluation of the combined RaaS-DaaS model with C = 100: (a) overall blocking in a Regular and RaaS-DaaS models; (b) Blocking gain (in %) in
RaaS-DaaS model as compare to a Regular system; and (c) fraction of observed data in RaaS-DaaS model for various λS at a fixed µd = 100.
in Fig. 6 performance of the combined RaaS-DaaS model to
show how the DaaS process impacts blocking and security
for a large-scale EOL with capacity 100 slots. As compare to
regular system and RaaS system, the overall blocking in our
combined RaaS-DaaS model highly depends on the load (in
Fig. 6a). To understand this, we plot blocking gain against the
load for various λS and µd in Fig. 6b. Here, blocking gain
is defined as the change in blocking (in %) in our combined
model as compare to the regular system. First, we see that
at lower loads blocking is higher irrespective of the λS and
µd. This is due to the fact that λS  λk, and therefore
the system spends more time in RaaS states which blocks
all incoming requests. At moderate loads, blocking gain is
positive and increasing with load. However, note that with the
increase in λS , the load (connection arrival rate) should also
increase to get the positive gain. Finally, at higher loads gain
again decreases due to increase in fragmentation. At last, the
security in the combined model (Fig. 6c) is as good as in the
RaaS model (Fig. 5c) due to the fact that defragmentation is
not just shifting the spectrum usage towards one end, but also
randomizes the connections while keeping free slots intact.
The most important findings of this paper are: i) in RaaS
model, increase in blocking can be minimized as compared to
the regular system without reconfiguration depending on the
mean reconfiguration time (E[TRT ] = 1/µd); ii) however, if
the mean reconfiguration time is much lower (e.g. µd = 1000)
than the mean holding time E[THk ], the overall blocking in our
combined RaaS-DaaS model is lower than the regular system
without reconfiguration, for a range of moderate loads; and
iii) the security can be improved by many folds with only
a smaller RP arrival rate. Based on our findings, network
operator can tune the reconfiguration times and RP arrival rate
for a particular load value of the network in order to experience
the higher gain from the our model.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the effect of spectrum realloca-
tion on the connections blocking and the associated security.
Based on our findings, we conclude that elastic optical network
operator can tune the mean RP interarrival time (1/λS) and
the mean reconfiguration time (1/µd) for a particular load
value of the network to experience the higher gain from our
model. In our combined model, we showed the effect on
the overall blocking probability of the system as function of
the load, reconfiguration rate (µd), the RP arrival rate (λS).
Additionally, the fraction of observed data decreases with the
RP arrival rate. For future work, we plan to extend our model
to a multi-hop EONs. This is not an easy task, since again, both
criteria of spectrum continuity as well as contiguity must be
considered in the analysis which can make it rather complex.
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